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Dynamic Forecasting and the Demand
for Money
SCOfl IL HEI.N
~‘IUCHof the statistical evidence on the break-
down in the short-run demand for money relationship
in the United States results from poor dynamic out-
of-sample simulations over the post-1974 period. How-
ever, this evidence must be regarded cautiously be-
cause the dynamic forecasting procedure lacks a firm
econometric foundation.
This paper reexamines the conclusions that have
emerged from these inadequate dynamic money de-
mand forecasts. First, it presents a conventional money
demand relationship and its post-1974 dynamic fore-
casts, along with a restatement of the conclusions
1Since only cx post forecasting is discussed in this paper, the
terms “forecasts” and “out-of-sample simulations” are used
interchangeably. In addition, this paper discusses the stability
of a relationship in the statistical sense: a relationship is said
to be stable if the regression coefficients are statistically in-
variant with time,
The following studies rely heavily on dynamic forecasting
performance in their analysis of the stability of the demand
for money relationship: Stephen M. Goldfeld, “The Case of
the Missing Money,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
(3:1976), pp. 683-730; Jared Enzler, Lewis Jolmson, and John
Paulus, “Some Problenis of Money Demand,’ Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity (1:1976), pp. 261-79; MichaelJ. Ham-
burger, “Behavior of the Money Stock: Is There a Puzzle?”
Journal of Monetary Economics (No. 3, 1977), pp. 265-88;
Gillian Garcia and Simon Pak, “Some Clues in the Case of
the Missing Money,” American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings (May 1979), pp. 330-34; and Richard D. Porter,
Thomas D. Simpson, and Eileen Mauskopf, “Financial Inno-
vation and the Monetary Aggregates,” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity (1:1979), pp. 213-29.
ERRATA:Change V to Y in eq. 4 & 11;
p. 16, col. 1, line 9; p. 16, col.
2, line 20. Change Y1~2-’Y1~2 to
~1+2~T+2’p. 17, col. 2, line 2,
drawn from such an investigation.2 Next, the dynamic
forecasting procedure is contrasted, in general terms,
with the more widely understood static forecasting
technique. This analysis provides a framework for
reevaluating conclusions about the breakdown in the
money demand relationship.
The review demonstrates that certain inferences
drawn from dynamic forecasts of money demand over
the post-1974 period are incorrect and misleading. In
general, the pattern and the degree of breakdown in
the money demand relationship has been obscured by
reliance on this forecasting procedure. The shifts are
neither as large nor as frequent as suggested by the
dynamic forecast errors.
A Conventional Demand for Money
Relationship and Its Dynamic Forecasts




/P,) = a, + a, In TBR~+ a, In RCB,





where Mi smeasured by old Ml balances, Pi sthe
2
With the exception of Michael J. Hamburger and Gillian
Garcia and Simon Pak, all of the above studies obtained poor
out-of-sample money demand simulations for the post-1974
pcriod. For an alternative view on the stability suggested by
Ilamburger and Garcia-Pak, see B. W. Hafer and Scott E.
Hem, “Evidence on the Temporal Stability of the Demand
for Money Relationship in the United States,” this Review
(December 1979), pp. 3-14.
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implicit GNP deflator (1972 = 100), TBR is the
treasury bill rate, RCB is the commercial bank pass-
book rate, GNPR is real GNP (1972 dollars), and St
is a random error term.3 This relationship was esti-
mated for the sample period IV/1960 — 11/1974 with
ordinary least squares, after correcting for serial cor-
relation in the error terms.4 The estimated coefficients
and summary statistics are as follows :~
(2) in (M,/P,) = —0.978 —0.012 In TBR, —0.044 In RGB, +
(4.01) (1,95) (2.33)




DW = 1.63; Durbin-h = 9.79
RHO = 0.57
All estimated coefficients have the anticipated sign,
are significantly different from zero, and are similar
in magnitude to those found by others. The coefficient
of determination corrected for degrees of freedom, ike,
shows that a substantial portion of the variation in
real money balances is explained by the independent
variables on the right-hand side of the equation.
This estimated equation was used to dynamically
forecast the dependent variable, ln (Mt/Pr), for the
post-sample period 111/1974 — IV/l979. With the ex-
ception of the lagged dependent variable, actual values
of the independent variables were used to perform
this dynamic simulation. For the first forecast, 111~
1974, the actual value of the lagged dependent variable
was used; thereafter, the previous period’s forecast
for this variable was utilized. The dynamic money
~This relationship and sample period were chosen for compar-
ison purposes. The relationship is similar to money demand
specihcations estimated by Goidfeld and Porter, et. aI. Both
studies, however, deflate the lagged money term on the right-
hand side of the equation by the contemporaneous price level.
In this study, the lagged money term is deflated by the
lagged price level so that the relationship has a true lagged
dependent variable. This simplifies the procedure used to ob-
tain dynamic forecasts, The sample period used in the study
coincides with that investigated by Porter, et. al.
4
This author, in a paper co-authored with B. W. Hafer, “The
Dynamics and Estimation of Short-Run Money Demand,” this
Review (March 1980), pp. 26-35, argues that directly esti-
mating the relationship described in equation (1) will yield
inconsistent estimates; the relationship should be first-
differenced before estimation. When this estimation procedure
is employed, the supposed breakdown in the relationship is
no longer evident. This present paper, however, follows the
more widely accepted practice of estimating equation (1)
directly, with the Cochrane-Orcutt technique.
°TheDurbin-h statistic, which is appropriate to test for serial
correlation in the disturbances when a lagged dependent vari-
able is present, indicates the existence of first-order autocorre-
lation, even after the Cochrane-Orcutt technique is used. ‘I’his
is a serious problem, indicating that more attention should be
devoted to the actual cstimation technique employed. How-
ever, since this specification and estimation technique is
widely used in money demand studies, no attempt to correct
this problem is made here. It should be noted that the esti-
mation results reported by Porter, et. al., are subject to the
same criticism.
demand forecasts and resulting forecast errors pre-
sented in table 1 (columns 3 and 4, respectively) are
in general agreement with those found by others.
Real money balances are consistently overpredicted
and by increasing proportions (table 1, column 6). For
example, by the second quarter of 1978, prior to the
introduction of nationwide ATS accounts and New
York NOW accounts, real money balances were fore-
easted to be approximately $27 billion above the
actual level for that period.8
The inability to accurately simulate the movement
of real money balances over this period led to the
general conclusion that the money demand relation-
ship shifted. In reviewing the evidence, Kimball
states: “As these overpredictions continued and in-
creased in size through 1975 and 1976, many econo-
mists concluded that the money demand function had
shifted during 1974 by a substantial amount and that
this shift placed in doubt the usefulness of (old) Ml as
either an indicator of GNP or as a policy instrument.”7
This summary statement pinpoints three separate
conclusions drawn from the errors associated with dy-
naniic out-of-sample simulations of money demand.
First, there is the contention that the relationship was
subject to some sort of shift in or around 1974. The
forecast errors suggest that this shift was quite sizable.
Second, the dynamic forecasting errors suggest that
the relationship has been shifting ever since late 1974
(column 3, table 1). This view is consistent with the
notion of a negative drift in money demand over the
period.8 Finally, the evidence of a shift and subse-
quent drift has raised a question about the usefulness
of this money measure as an indicator of monetary
policy.
Static Versus Dynamic Forecasts:
A General Comparison
Although the dynamic forecasting procedure has
been a primary tool used to evaluate the statistical
breakdown in the money demand relationship, it has
received little, if any, attention in the econometric
literature. This section attempts to partially fill the
“It is felt that the introduction of these interest-bearing “check-
ing deposits” has led to a shift out of conventional demand de-
posits, Evidence of this type of shift is provided subsequently.
7
RaIph C. Kimball, “Wire Transfer and the Demand for
Money,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston New England Eco-
nornic Reeiew (March/April 1980), p. 14. 8
See for example, Porter, et. ai., “Financial Innovations and the
Monetary Aggregates,” p. 214. In that article, table 1 indicates
that quarterly real balances grew at an annualized rate of
nearly 4 percent below that suggested by the estimnation equa-
tion for the period III/1974-lV/1976. Also, see “Inflatmon and
the Destruction of Monetarism,’ (New York: Goldman Sachs
Economics, November 1979), pp. 5-12.
14FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JUNE JULY 1980
Table 1
Post-Sample Dynamic Forecasts of Money Demand (IIl/1974-IV/1979)
Dynamic forecast Dynamic forecast
Dynarnc Dynamic erroras error in billions
Actuai forecast of forecast percent of of real
Date In (M.’F.) In ~M,’P,) error dependent variable money balancesi
Ul/1974 0.8645 0.8865 —0.0220 —2.54 $ -5.28
P1/1974 0.8462 0.8872 -0.0410 —4.84 —9.75
1/1975 0.8260 0.8851 -0.0591 -7.16 —13.91
1/1975 0.8260 0.8880 0.0620 —7.51 —14.61
11/1975 0.8264 0.8925 0.0661 8.00 1561
lV,1975 0.8157 0.8975 0.0788 -9.63 -18.59
1/1976 0.8213 0.9071 --0.0858 --10.44 -20.37
11/1976 0.8258 0.9129 -0.0871 —10.55 -20.78
111/1976 0.6246 0.9178 0.0932 —11.31 -22.28
lV/1976 0.8283 0.9233 0.0950 —11.47 —22.82
1/1977 0.8320 0.9310 - 0.0990 —11.90 —23.91
11/1977 0.8319 0.9371 —0.1052 -12.65 - 25.49
111/1977 0.8415 0.9425 -0.1009 —11.99 —24.65
IV/ 1977 0.8442 0.9452 -0.1010 —11.96 —24.72
1/1978 0.8455 0.9470 —0.1016 -12.00 -24.88
11/1978 0.8429 0.9519 -0.1090 —12.93 26.75
111/1978 0.8451 0.9549 -0.1098 —12.99 -27.02
IV/1978 0.8350 0.9574 0.1224 -14.66 —30.01
1/1979 0.8092 0.9584 0.1492 18.44 —36.14
11i1979 0.8071 0.9619 --0.1 548 -19.18 —37.52
111/1979 0.8107 0.9591 0.1484 18.31 —35.99




Theirs inequality coefficient: 0.126
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the parameters a0, am, a2 are non-stochastic and
known with certainty.0
Under these conditions the traditional static fore-




= a, + a, X~+
1
+ a, YT.
According to the maintained hypothesis of structural
stability, eqttation (3) is appropriate_for period T+ 1.
As a result, a forecast error (YT,m — m) is expected
and this error is equal to Er,
1
. The expected value of
the forecast error, E ( E.r÷m), is zero by assumptiomi. It
is important to recognize that this result can he gen-
eralized for any time period for which equation (3)
is valid and a static forecast is developed. Specifically,
for any time period for which equation (3) is true,
a forecast error can be expected and this error will be
a random variable with a zero expected value and a
Constant variance, ~2 (table 2),
Provided the variance of the disturbances (~2) is
known, the static forecast errors can he used to de-
termine whether the relationship is temporally stable
(he., whether equation (3) holds after T). The static
forecast error should, by hypothesis, behave as a nor-
mally distributed random variable with mean zero
and variance 02, Contradictory evidence, such as
static forecast errors that are large relative to ~2,
would suggest that equation (3) does not characterize
the post-sample period. Consistently one-sided static
forecast errors (eg., under- or overpredictions)
would also support such a conclusion. Using similar
reasoning, Brown, Durhin, and Evans have developed
formal tests to ascertain whether a relationship such
as that described by equation (3) remains valid over
an extended lime period.10
simple and relatively straightforward; dynamic fore-
casts use previously forecasted values of the lagged
dependent variable instead of actual values. In other
words, the forecaster is assumed to know the actual
value of all the explanatomy variables on the right-
hand side of the equation, except for the lagged de-
pendent variable.h1 Consequently, in dynamic fore-
casting, an estimate of the lagged dependent variable
— specifically, the value forecasted for the previous
period — must replace the actual value of the variable
that would he used in static forecasting. In this re-
spect, the dynamic forecasts are developed as part of
a recursive system.
To better understand the dynamic forecasting pro-
cedure, assume equation (3) holds for t=1, - . . T,
and dynamic forecasts for periods beyond T are de-
sired.12 The actual value of Y~is used to form the
initial dynamic forecast of Y-~-~. Thus, the dynamic




The resulting dynamic forecast error (Y~2,— Yr±m)is
— identical to the forecast error that occurred in
the static forecasting procedure. Consequently, every-
thing said about the first static forecast error holds for
the dynamic forecast error as well.
Flowever, in forecasting Y for the subsequent pe-
riod (T+2), the forecasted value of Y~’,m,rather than
the actual value, is used to develop the dynamic fore-
cast. Thus, the T±2dynamic forecast is represented
by:
(6) IT,, a,+aXv<+a,Yr.,.
Using the equation for the previous period’s dynamic
forecast error,
(7) Yx,m’YxmEr., (=>Yr,,sYr,_Er,m),
The difference between these static forecasts and the
dynamic forecasts used in money demand studies is
°The assmimption that the parameters are known with certainty
makes the analysis simpler and, more imnportantlv. doesn’t
effect the central conclmmsiomss dra\vmm imm timis sectito. The reader
is refemrcd to I-Ic sri Theil Applied EcunoIll me Jorecasting,
Chicago, North-Holland, 1966), pp. 5-8, for a discussiomm of
the case wherc t lii’ parammmeters mm (3) ale ordina my least
square estinsates. Thc ammalysis imi this paper, based on the
assuusptiomm that the paramneters are kisowmm with certainty,
will uodc,-cst,imtatc the variance of the forecast ermor if the
forecasts are actually baser! omm paramneters that are obtained
from ordimmary least squares.
~L . Browms, J. Dtmrhin, and J - M. Evaos, “Techniques for
Testing tlse Commstancy of Regression Relationships Over
Time,’’ Joormmal of the Royal Statistical Society ( Vol. 37
1975), pp. 149-92. In one sense, the test the authors Lie—
scribe is more geoemaI than that discmmssed here. Specifically,
they investigate the stability of a relationshIp when the
right—hand side parammieters are actually raudomn variables,
and when 02 is mmnkncswn. Ilowever, they do mmot commsider
the specific case imm which a lagged depemideut variable is in—
eluded as an additional explasmatom-v variable.
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equation (6) can be rewritten as:
(8) Yr.s=~ao+amXr,,±a,(1x Er-m).
Dymiamuic foi-eeastimmg appeals to he particmmlarly appropriate
for stmmclv im mg all eq mmat iom m tisat Ilas a lagged depen dim m t van —
able a od that is part of a ha m-ger msmodi-l. If tIle right —ham md
side variables, other than tile lagged depemmdemmt variable,
‘vt-ri- all t-xogemlm oms, dy-mi asnie fiimec-ast hO wOoId give a ‘-alid
9 mclicat io m m of tIlt’ ‘it mm rdiness’’ of that relat iomsship - IIowe’ -Cr,
in tlsr’ case of mmmmcv demammd, all of tIlt’ rigilt—hall ci sick-
‘-ariables would he em) dogeml(mmms so a fuller mntsrlel am~ ci thus
should he fom’eeasted as well. 1mm this m-espect, it is stramlge
that civ mmammlie forecasting ima,s bc’comsm es opopsJar in 1110mmt-y
demsmammd studies, while true cx a mite fom-ecastimmg ( in which all
of tile right—hammcl sidle vamiables ame forecasted) would pro—
vine bitter insight immto the pm’ohlemns associated with actually
hmm’ec-astin g nusnev deml lamId. Lx atm t c fort-east errors wommId
provide ab e t t Cr mmmlcierstami chm Ig of tlie actmmal prolml ellis I aeimlg
pol icymllakers imm fom’eeastin g the demmlamid for mommey. 2
flecali the assumsiptiomi that time paramneters a
2
, a,, and a,




If equation (3) continues tohold for
value of the dependent variable will
(9) Yr,, = a, + a1
Xr,, + a, Y
10
+ er,,.
independent, as has been assumed, the variance of
the dynamic forecast error, var (Y.1~1
— Y’r,,) is
~2 [1 + a,}2.iS
Figure 1 compares the two alternative distributions
under the assumption that both a1 and 02 equal unity.
The distribution associated with the static forecast
error is clearly more concentrated about the mean of
the distribution than the dynamic forecast error.
Since the standard deviation of the static forecast error
is equal to one, it is smaller than the dynamic forecast
error, which is equal to ~ ( 1.414). In the statis-
tical sense, the dynamic forecasting procedure can be
considered inefficient relative to the static forecasting
framework. This means that there is a higher prob-
ability of observing a dynamic forecasting error on the
far tail ends of the distribution than there is with a
static forecast. As a result, the investigator should he
less confident in the former type of forecast.
In terms of evaluating the temporal stability of a
relationship such as that presented in equation (3),
the relatively larger variance associated with the dy-
1~
Thevariance of the dynamic forecast error, Var (Y
1
,, --
equals ~‘ar (Er. + a, &r_m ) accordimlg to equation ( 10). This
hatter term, by assumptidsn of independemsee in the disturb-
ances, eqmsais Var (Er,,) + Var (a-, Erm), which finally








Subtracting equation (8) from equation (9) yields
the following dynamic forecast error for T+2:
(10) Y
1
,, — = Er-, + a, Er,m,
which can be compared with the static forecast error




These alternative forecast errors are statistically
similar in one sense, but quite different in another.
Since, according to the null hypothesis of stability, the
expected value of each disturbance, Et (t = 1, -.
is zero, the expected value of both the static forecast
error and the dynamic forecast error will be zero. In
this respect, there would be no reason to prefer one
forecasting procedure over the other, since both will
yield unbiased forecasts.
The variance of these two forecast errors, however,
is quite different. The variance of the static forecast
error is the variance of the error, Er+-,, which is simply
ci’. Equation (10) shows that the variance of the dy-
namic forecast error will be larger than this for all
cases in which a, is non-zero. If the errors are
17namic forecasting procedure indicates that, for any
given confidence interval, a larger dynamic forecast-
ing error (than that associated with the static fore-
casting procedure) is required before the null hy-
pothesis of temporal stability can be rejected.
Table 2 presents static and dynamic forecast errors
and the variance of these respective errors for periods
T+1 through T+3. In addition, these particulars are
generalized for the K~5period beyond the end of the
sample period, T. The generalization shows that the
as dynamic forecasting procedure becomes increasingly
inefficient relative to the static forecasting procedure,
the further the forecast is from the end of the sample
period. As long as a, is less than unity, however,
increments in the variance of the dynamic forecast
error will diminish with time.
The table also shows the interesting fact that the
dynamic forecast error for any given period can be
calculated based on the knowledge of the parameter,
a,, and on the static forecast errors for that same period
and prior periods; that is, the dynamic forecast error
for T+K is simply a weighted average of the static
forecast errors, Er, 2r÷i ET+K, with the weights
determined by a,. The essential contribution of the
dynamic forecasting procedure is its unique weight-
ing scheme for current and past static forecast errors.
If the investigator is interested in determining the
long-run forecasting accuracy of his model, the
weighting scheme of the dynamic forecasting method-
ology is uniquely appropriate.
It is further evident from table 2 that the weighting
scheme depends crucially on the parameter a, (the
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable). Other
things being equal, the researcher developing dynamic
forecasts will prefer a smaller value for this para-
meter, because it is the mechanism by which past
18
forecast errors are fed through the system. The smaller
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, the
less impact its value will have on subsequent fore-
casts. The table also shows that, if a, exceeds unity,
the dynamic forecasting framework becomes explo-
sive: Past static forecast errors are given increasing
weight as the forecast period is extended.
Finally, in terms of the question of the temporal
stability of a relationship, table 2 indicates that the
static and dynamic forecast errors will yield different
patterns as a result of a shift in the relationship. For
example, suppose a once-and-for-all intercept shift in
equation (3) occurs at T+1, such that
(12) Y, (a, +ö) + amXm + a, Ym-m + Et
holds for all t>T+1. If static forecasts are developed
under the erroneous assumption that equation (3)
presents the correct relationship, the resulting fore-
cast error will be ~+b (for all t>T+1). As a result,
there will be a bias in the forecast of the size, 8,
that will persist irrespective of the time for which the
forecast is made (table 3).
In the case of dynamic forecasting, the path of the
forecasts errors that occurs in the face of this same
intercept shift is considerably different. With dynamic
forecasting, the forecast will deviate from the actual
level not only because the intercept shift is not built
into the forecast, but also because the lagged de-
pendent variable is inaccurately forecast for inter-
vening periods. Since the dynamic forecasting frame-
work is a recursive system, these latter inaccuracies
will cumulate over time.
Figure 2 compares the path (i.e., the expected
value) of the static and dynamic forecast errors for a
once-and-for-all, b-sized intercept shift with a para-
meter value of a, = 01. Although the hypothesized
shift in the relationship is the same in both cases, the
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Table 2
Static and Dynamic Forecasts Errors
Static Vailance of Dvimahts:c Variam.ce of
foreca4 static forteast dynai.Cc
‘lime error forccast error error forecaste rm mm’
T±1 GTe & Er, C
T;2 Er,m C’ ~ --a-c., &C1+a
2
)
T3 Er., C’ E:..+aEr.
4
±a:Em., &(1fa~+a)
K o mc —
TX Es & &m..x-m!.o a’I ‘a:]
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Figure 2
Expected Value of Static and Dynamic Forecast
Errors Under Assumption of a ó-Sized
Once-And-For-All Intercept Shift
- iu t+z 1+3 1+4 1+5 1+6 1+7
expected path of the two alternative forecast enors occurrence. In addition if the reseascher ms provided
is quite diflesent. Even an ‘rstnte investigator could oisl~the d~namicforecast rrors the shift in the re-
easil\ misjudge the once and-for all intescept shift in lationship is likels to he judged las g r th’rn it actualh
the ieFitionship if the onls mnformation po ovided is is. In the above ex’imple the relationship was h\ poth
the pattem n of the d~ namic forccast errors. The me esiz d to hax e shifted up by 5, hut all the d\ namic
seascher ~sould p~ ohahls perceive the shift as a con fom c cast erm oms after 1 + 1 e cced this m-ignitude b\
tinuing phenomenon rathes than a once-and for-all cvei-increasmng amounts.
Table 3
Static and Dynamic Forecast Errors Under the
Assumption of an tntercept Shift (b}
B arm
Stat,c Bias in Dynamic dyrmamume
forecast static forecast foreca
Tins erro foreea t error error
Ti Er &&Ep+& &
T 2 Er & & Erm+& a,(Er +8)
T S Er +8 & Ero+& a~(Er +8) 8(1 a, a)
dim(er +8)
K (mis a,
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Table 4
Post-Sample Static Forecast of Money Demand (lII/1974-IV/1979)
S’atic forecast Slatmc forecast
Static Static crrOr as error in bml.mons
Actual forecast of forecast percent of of real
Date l~ ~M, P ) In fM- P.) orror dependent variable rnone~batarcc&
111/1974 0.8645 0.8865 0.0220 -2.54 S 5.28
IV’1974 0.8462 0.8753 0.0291 -3.44 6.88
‘1975 0.8260 0.8629 0.0369 —4.47 -8.59
1/1975 0.8260 0.5560 -0.0300 3.63 6.96
111/1975 0.8264 0.8589 —0.0325 —3.93 --7.54
1V11975 0.8187 0.8617 -0.0430 5.26 --9.96
1/1976 0.8213 0.8644 0.0431 5.24 --10.01
11/1976 0.8258 0.8665 -0.0406 -4.92 9.49
llI/1976 0.8246 0.8706 -0.0461 5.59 —10.74
IV/1976 0.8283 0.8728 0.0445 --5.38 —10.42
1/1977 0.8320 0.8795 - 0.0475 5.71 -11.18
11/1977 0.8319 0.8835 00516 -6.21 —12.17
111/1977 0.8415 0.8855 —0.0439 -5.22 -10.44
IV/1977 0.8442 0.8905 —0.0463 -5.49 --11.02
/1978 0.8455 0.8923 —0.0468 --5.53 -11.16
11,1978 0.8429 0.8969 -0.0540 —6.41 12.89
lii, 1978 0.8451 0.5959 -0.0508 6.01 -12.13
IV/1978 0.6350 0.8979 0.0629 7.53 14.96
1/1979 0.8092 0.8921 0.0829 10.25 19.41
11/1979 0.8071 0.8811 -0.0740 -9.16 --17.22
111/1979 0.8107 0.5752 -0.0646 -7.97 14.99




TheiVs inequ-ahty coefficment: 0.061
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overpredicted and by fairly sizable amounts through-
out the post-1974 period. The root-mean-squared-error
for the static forecasts over the period 111/1974 — IV/
1979 is approximately ten times the sample period’s
standard error of the equation, suggesting that some-
thing in the relationship has indeed changed over the
post-1974 period.’4
While the static forecast results support the conclu-
sion that the money demand relationship has shifted,
they do not corroborate other inferences drawn from
dynamic forecast errors. Reliance on the dynamic
forecasting technique has senously exaggerated the
magnitude of the breakdown in the relationship. For
example, the 11/1978 dynamic forecast of money de-
mand overestimates real money balance by almost $27
billion. Many studies suggest that this forecast error
is an estimate of the magnitude of the “downshift” in
the money demand relationship.
When the same estimated relationship is statically
rather than dynamically simulated, however, a much
smaller estimate of the downshift emerges. In the case
of static forecasts, real money balances are projected
to be “only” $13 billion above the actual level in
11/1978. The reason for the significant difference in
these forecast errors is that the dyllamic forecast error
is simply a weighted average of current and past static
forecast errors. As table 4 shows, the static forecast
errors in money demand have been consistently one-
sided (overpredicted) since 111/1974. Consequently,
the dynamic forecast error for any period thereafter
has always exceeded the static forecast error.
Although the dynamic forecasting procedure indi-
cates hosv errors can cumulate over the long-run, it
provides a poor basis for measuring the extent of the
“shift” in the relationship. Again, consider the $27 bil-
lion dynamic forecast error for 11/1978. This error
tells the policymaker the extent to which forecasts of
real money balances would have been inaccurate if
equation (2) had been used in 11/1974 to project 11/
1978 money demand, assuming that he had full infor-
mation about the actual course of interest rates and
real income but no knowledge of the course of actual
real money balances over the four-year intervening
period. On the other hand, the $13 bilhon static fore-
cast error for 11/1978 tells the policymaker how inac-
curate his prediction of real money balances would
have been if he had used the coefficients in equation
(2) but had full knowledge of the 1/1978 level of
“This conclusion is further supported by a Chow test, which






statistic for 5, 69 degrees of freedom, is 5.23. Thus, the null
hypothesis can be rejected at the 1 percent level.
real money balances. Thus, over one-half of the dy-
namic forecast error for 11/1978 is due to the error in
predicting real money balances in the previous period
and should not be considered part of the “shift” in
the relationship.
One example of impropes-ly using dynamic forecast
errors to measure the extent of the money demand
shift is provided by the work of Tinsley and Garrett.’5
These authors argue that the introduction of immedi-
ately available funds (IF) in the mid-1970’s was
largely responsible for the downshift in money de-
mand. To support the argument that the introduction
of these financial assets have displaced a portion of
conventional deruaud deposits, they’ compare the size
of IF with the dynamic forecast errors for a demand
deposit equation: “There is, of course, a striking simi-
larity between the magnitude of IF - --and the size
of the dynamic (emphasis added) forecast error of
demand deposits •.“~
If, as these authors argue, economic agents simply
substituted IF for demand deposits in their portfolios,
the dynamic forecast error should have increased
at a faster rate than the growth of IF. This would
occur because the dynamic forecast for periods be-
y’ond T+1 would differ from the actual observation
by the magnitude of the shift in funds plus a weighted
average of previous forecast errors for demand de-
posits. It is precisely this latter portion of the fore-
cast error that many investigators ignore. Thus, rather
than providing support, the similarity in magnitude
between IF and the dynamic forecast errors actually
casts doubt on the Tinsley-Garrett argument.
The use of the dynamic forecasting technique has
also masked the pattern of the shift in the money de-
rnand relationship. As suggested at the outset, dynamic
forecasts of money demand have led some researchers
to conclude that there has been a continuous down-
shift in the relationship following 11/1974, because the
dynamic forecast errors have been increasing over
time (figure 3).” Obviously, the argument that this
pattern of dynamic forecast errors implies a contin-
uous shift in the relationship is invalid.
In contrast to the view of a continuous drift in the
relationship, the static forecast errors suggest three
uP.A Tinsley and Bominie Garrett, with M. F. Friar, “The
Measurement of Mormey Demand,” Special Studies Paper, No.
133 (Board of Governors of the Federal flesen’e System
1978).




For this view see Porter, et, al. “Financial Innovations and
the Monetary Aggregates.” For a more elementary app,-oach,
see “Inflation and the Destruction of Monetarism,” pp. 5-12.
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Figure 3
Static and Dynamic Forecast Errors of Money
Demand Equations
Lag Roil Balances Less
Lag Fareamted Balances
separate intercept shifts.’8 The first shift — equal to
approximately —003 (table 4, colmun 4) — occurred
in 111/1974. There is, however, little evidence to sup-
port the notion that any further significant shifts oc-
cun-ed prior to IV/1975. All of the static forecast
errors that occurred over the period I\T/1974 — 111/
1975 are within two standard errors of the estimated
equation (SEE) on either side of —0.03.
Another discrete shift in the relationship in IV/1975
is apparent from the jump in the static forecast error
from 111/1975 to IV/1975. Again, while there is a
slight drift in the relationship, it does not appear to
change significantly over the subsequent three-year
period; from IV/1975 to 111/1978, the static forecast
error fluctuates around —005. Static forecast errors
over this period are within two standard errors of the
estimated equation on either side of this point. Finally,
in IV/1978, another downshift is indicated by the dis-
crete jump in the static forecast error’°But, again,
‘
8
For support of this notion of selected shifts in the money de-
mand relationship, see Michael R. Darby, “The Intemational
Economy as a Source of and Restraint on United States In-
flation,” Working Paper No. 347 (Cambridge, Mass.: National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., January 1980).
~Note that this latter point coincides with the introduction of
nationwide ATS accounts and New York NOW accounts.
error subsequently stabilizes around this
The pattern of breakdown suggested by the static
estimation procedure differs greatly from that de-
duced from the ever-increasing dynamic forecast errors
shown in figure 3. The static forecasting procedure
isolates the periods 111/1974, IV/1975, and IV/1978
as the specific shift points that require further study.
The analysis also suggests that, as far as short-run
forecasting is concerned, the best the researcher can
do in the future is to assume that any statistically
significant shift in the relationship is a once-and-for-
all occurrence.
CONCLUSION
This paper demonstrates that the magnitude of the
recent downward shift in the money demand rela-
tionship has been exaggerated and the pattern of the
precise shifts has been obscured by reliance on the
dynamic forecasting procedure to evaluate the tem-
poral stability of the money demand relationship.
The magnitude of the shift is much smaller (in fact, insig-
nificant) if MIB is mised in place of MI as the monetary
aggregate measure.
Leg Real Balances Lesm
Lag Forecasted Balgacem
-.00
m974 9915 9916 9971 1916 1979
the forecast
higher level.
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The pattern of ever-increasing dynamic forecast
errors has led some investigators to conclude that
money demand has been subject to a downward drift
since 111/1974, and, as a result, they argue that money
is no longer a useful policy instrument or indicator.
On the contrary, the evidence in this paper supports
the notion of discrete once-and-for-all shifts in the re-
lationship, and isolates the periods of late 111/1974,
IV/1975, and IV/1978 as specific periods of these
shifts.
By rejecting the notion of a constantly shifting
money demand relationship, this paper reaffirms the
usefulness of money as a policy instrument. By using
the conventional money demand equation considered
here, a policymaker, unaware of the financial inno-
vations occurring over the recent period, would have
made only three significant errors in forecasting the
growth rate of real money balances. Consequently,
only on these three separate occasions would the
linkage between money and prices have been other
than expected.
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Finally, although this paper has presented long-
range (dynamic) forecasts of money demand which
are in serious error, this evidence should not be inter-
preted as highly critical of a long-range policy of
money control, such as Friedman’s X-percent rule.
The period considered in this paper, III/1974-IV/1979,
was one of ever-accelerating monetary growth, which
resulted in a higher rate of inflation, as well as higher
interest rates. These high interest rates, in turn, have
led to financial innovations (eg, ATS accounts, NOW
accounts, and money market mutual funds) designed
to circumvent Federal Reserve regulations (primarily
Regulation 9 interest rate ceilings) - To the extent
that these financial innovations have been responsible
for the shifts in money demand, the ultimate precur-
sor of the shifts has been the excessive growth of
money over this period. In other words, it is legitimate
to question whether money demand would have been
subject to the few shifts experienced had monetary
growth not accelerated over the past decade.
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